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CASE NOTES

MASS MEDIA-COURT PROCEEDINGS-MANDATORY
CLOSURE STATUTE WHICH EXCLUDES THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND PRESS FROM SEXUAL OFFENSE
TRIALS INVOLVING MINOR VICTIMS VIOLATES THE
FIRST AMENDMENT-Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (1982).
Section 16A of Chapter 278 of the Massachusetts General
Laws required that trial judges exclude the general public
from trials involving specified sexual offenses against minors.1
In April 1979, during hearings on preliminary motions in a
trial for the rape of three minor girls, the trial judge invoked
section 16A and ordered the courtroom closed. Globe Newspaper asked the court to remove the closure order and requested
that it be allowed to intervene to assert its first and sixth
amendment rights to be present at the trial and pre-trial
hearings. 2 The trial court denied these motions and Globe
0 1983 by Deborah Manson
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981) provided in pertinent part:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or
other crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is
the person upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been
committed . . . the presiding justice shall exclude the general public
from the court room, admitting only such persons as may have a direct
interest in the case.
Massachusetts was the only state that had a mandatory closure provision for sexual
offense trials involving minor victims. Other states have discretionary provisions. 102
S. Ct. at 2621 n.22. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-202 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9.3 (1973 Supp. 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1006 (1956 Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:469.1 (West 1981); Miss. CONST. art. III, § 26; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632A:8 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-166
(Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-02 (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-4 (1953);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1901 (1973). See also FLA. STAT. § 918.16 (1982) (providing
for mandatory exclusion of the general public but not the press during testimony of
minor victims).
2. The first amendment provides in part that "Congress shall make no law. ..
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
sixth amendment states in part that "in all criminal prosections, the accused shall
1.
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appealed.
Nine months after the criminal trial had ended, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Globe's appeal
on the grounds of mootness. Nonetheless, because the issues
presented were "'significant and troublesome, and . . .capable of repetition yet evading review,'" the court addressed
the merits of the case. The Supreme Judicial Court found that
section 16A did not require that the press be barred from the
entire criminal trial,' rather, it only required mandatory closure of sex-offense trials during the testimony of minor victims and gave powers for discretionary closure of other segments of these trials. The court, noting that it would await a
then pending United States Supreme Court decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,' did not rule on Globe's
constitutional claims.
Globe appealed to the United States Supreme Court
which remanded the case to the Supreme Judicial Court for
further consideration based on Richmond Newspapers. On remand, the court dismissed Globe's appeal," stating that the
Richmond Newspapers decision did not invalidate the
mandatory closure requirement because section 16A was narrow in scope and protected the legitimate needs of victims.7
The United States Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court reversed the decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, holding that the mandatory closure
requirement of section 16A violates the first amendment.'
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. 379 Mass. 846, 401 N.E.2d, 362, (1981) (quoting Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
4. The purpose of the statute, the court held, was "to encourage young victims
of sexual offenses to come forward; once they have come forward, the statute is
designed to preserve their ability to testify by protecting them from undue psychological harm at trial." 379 Mass. 846, 401 N.E.2d at 369.
5. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
6. The court relied on the fact that historically trials dealing with sexual assaults involving minor victims have been at least partially closed to the public. In
addition, the court determined that state interests which were furthered by the
mandatory closure rule would not be advanced by a case-by-case determination. Finally, the court decided that it was unnecessary to consider Globe's argument that
the statute violated the sixth amendment rights of the criminal defendant because
these rights, "at least in the context of this case,[could] only be asserted by the original criminal defendant." Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Ct., Mass. 846, 423 N.E.
2d 773 (1981).
7. Id. at 423 N.E.2d at 781.
8. 102 S.Ct. 2613 (1982). The Court did not address the sixth amendment claim
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The Court first noted that the case was not moot under
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution" because Globe
served the Boston area, and it might at some future time be
confronted with the mandatory closure statute.10 In addition,
since criminal trials are usually short in duration, a closure
order would probably evade review."
Concerning the first amendment issue, the Court concluded that, while the right of access to criminal trials is not
specifically mentioned in the Constitution, the press and general public do have a right to attend criminal trials. The Court
rejected a narrow, literal reading of the first amendment, reasoning that "the Framers were concerned with broad principles and wrote against a background of shared values and
practices."' Moreover, the "right of access" plays an important part in the public's participation in the judicial process
and in the government. Relying on Mills v. Alabama,'" the
Court stressed that a major purpose of the first amendment
was to preserve the right to freely discuss governmental
affairs."'
The Court then explained that historically the press and
the general public have had access to criminal trials.' 5 When
the Constitution was adopted, criminal trials in the United
102 S.Ct. at 2618 n.10. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in which Justices
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joined.

9. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority .... U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
10. 102 S. Ct. at 2618.
11. Id. (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976)).
12. 102 S. Ct. at 2619.
13. 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).

14. "Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the
integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society
as a whole." 102 S.Ct. at 2620. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
569 (19 ) (plurality opinion); 448 U.S. at 596-97 (Brennan, J., concurring); Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979).
15. 102 S. Ct. at 2619. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the dissent, strongly

disagreed with the majority's contention. According to Burger, exclusion of the public
from trials involving sexual offenses (especially those against minors) has had a long
history. 102 S.Ct. at 2624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Harris v. Stephens, 361
F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967); Reagan v. United States,
202 F. 2d 488 (9th Cir. 1913); United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821, (D. Alaska),
aff'd, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); State v. Purvis,

157 Conn. 198 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969); Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437
(1935); Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648 (1921), appeal dismissed, 260 U.S. 702 (1922).

950
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States and in England had long been presumptively open.1"
This presumption of openness has endured, and in 1948 when
the Court held that the due process clause forbids closed trials, no criminal trial,' 7 either in federal, state, or municipal
court, could be found that had been closed to the general public and press. 8
The right of the general public and press to attend criminal trials, however, is not absolute. The Court noted that the
State may close the courtroom upon showing a compelling interest in barring the press and general public access to sexoffense trials during the testimony of minor victims and showing that the closure is "narrowly tailored to serve that interest.'" Because the circumstances in each case vary, the magnitude of the State's interest will change from trial to trial.
Therefore, the Court determined that a case-by-case analysis
will sufficiently protect the interests of the minor victim.20
The trial court, when making a determination, should consider the age of the victim, the victim's level of psychological
maturity, the crime involved, and the interests of the
parents."'
Turning to the case at bar, Massachusetts asserted interests in protecting minor victims of sex crimes from further
trauma and humiliation, and in encouraging these victims to
appear in a credible manner.2 2 The Court noted that since the
names of victims were a matter of public record,2 3 they may
16.

102 S. Ct. at 2619 n.13. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at

569.
17. In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). It was stated in this case that "[tlhe
knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on the possible abuse of judicial
power." Id. at 270.
18. 102 S. Ct. at 2619.
19. Id. at 2620. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 102 S.Ct. 1523, 1529 (1982); Smith
v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-03 (1979); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963). According to the Court, the Massachusetts statute was not a "narrowly tailored means of accomodating the State's asserted interest" since a case-bycase decision of the State's concern in the well-being of the minor victim would suffice. The Court stated that this would ensure that the right of the press and general
public to be present at criminal trials would not be taken away unless the State's
interest needs to be protected. 102 S. Ct. at 2621-22.
20. The case-by-case determination was first suggested by the plurality opinion
in Richmond Newspapers, 102 S. Ct. at 2621 n.20.
21. 102 S. Ct. at 2621.
22. Id. at 2620.
23. The Court in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), held
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have agreed to testify in front of the press. 24 Therefore, if closure were discretionary, the trial court might have found that
closure was unnecessary.
Although section 16A bars the press and public from the
courtroom during the testimony of the victims, the Court
stressed that the press is nonetheless allowed access to the
transcript, court personnel, or other sources that heard the
testimony. The press, therefore, can publish the statements
made during the testimony as well as the identity of the victim. The Court pointed out that if the State wants victims to
come forward and believes that the victims will do so only if
their testimony and their identity is kept secret, then section
16A is not effective in this regard.26 Moreover, minor victims
of sexual offenses are not the only victims who may hesitate to
come forward and testify because of the publicity surrounding
criminal trials. The Court concluded that the Massachusetts
law providing for mandatory closure of sexual offense trials
during the testimony of minor victims violates the right of access of the general public and press to criminal trials. As the
plurality in Richmond Newspapers noted, "'a presumption of
openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under

our system of justice.'

"926

The Court relied heavily on Richmond Newspapers which
established that the press and general public have a first
amendment right of access to criminal trials.2 7 In Richmond
Newspapers, the trial judge, relying on a discretionary closure
statute, ordered the court closed to avoid any exchange of in'28
formation during the recesses as to "who testified to what.
that the government cannot prevent the publication of the names of minor rape victims legally obtained from the public record. See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
24. 102 S. Ct. at 2616 n.5.
25. Id. at 2622.
26. Id. (quoting 448 U.S. at 573).
27. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), the Court held that the
sixth amendment does not provide the public or press a right to attend a pretrial
hearing. Moreover, while the Court noted that the sixth amendment right to a public
trial is for the benefit of the defendant, it did not decide whether the first amendment guarantees a right of the access to criminal trials.
28. 448 U.S. at 560. The trial court relied on the state statute which provides in
part:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any
persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated.
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The United States Supreme Court held that case-by-case
determinations are required before the right to access to a
criminal trial may be taken away. The Court stated that
"[a]bsent an overriding interest, articulated in findings, the
trial of a criminal case must be open to the public. '2 9 The
Globe Newspaper decision elaborated on Richmond Newspapers by holding that the press and public have a first amendment right not to be mandatorily excluded from sex-offense
trials during the testimony of minor victims.
In both Globe Newspaper and Richmond Newspapers,
there was a definite infringement of first amendment rights,
and, in both cases, the Court utilized the "exacting scrutiny"
test s to determine whether that infringement was justified.
For the Court to uphold the infringement under the "exacting
scrutiny" test, the State must prove (1) that there is a sufficiently important or compelling government interest, (2) that
the means used are substantially related to the end, or the
means chosen are narrowly tailored to serve the government
interest, and (3) that the state action is the least onerous alternative for furthering the asserted government interest."1
Courts are confronted with a sensitive situation whenever
a minor victim of a sexual crime is to testify. Public testimony
may bring about further trauma, humiliation, and embarrassment for the victim. Massachusetts was the only state that
had a mandatory closure rule that barred the press and public
from sexual offense trials involving minor victims. 3 2 In addition, no state presently has a mandatory closure statute for
sexual offense trials involving victims of majority age. The
VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (Supp. 1980).
29. 448 U.S. at 581.
30. The Burger Court has applied an "exacting scrutiny" test when there has
been a government infringement of first amendment rights. See, e.g., Citizens Against
Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299, (1981); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 270, (1981); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (plurality opinion).
31. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290
(1981); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978). Although the Court in Globe Newspaper did not expressly refer to the
third prong, it appears that it did consider the third prong by stating that a trial
court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is required to protect the
well-being of the minor victim. 102 S. Ct. at 2621. Thus, the Court was showing that

mandatory closure is not the least onerous alternative.
32. See supra note 2.
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distinction between majority and minority age for mandatory
closure of sex-offense trials is not a logical distinction. The
circumstances will vary from trial to trial. A person over eighteen may suffer the same trauma as a minor. On the other
hand, a minor may be emotionally and psychologically mature
enough to handle the press and public in the courtroom during his or her testimony.
Therefore, in holding that the decision of whether or not
to exclude the press and public from a sexual offense trial
during the testimony of a minor victim must be made on a
case-by-case basis, the Court has taken into account the differing circumstances of each witness and trial. The Globe
Newspaper decision protects two very important interests: the
first amendment right of access of the press and general public to criminal trials, and, in appropriate instances, the welfare
of the minor sexual offense victim during trial.
Deborah Manson

THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959-UNION MEMBERS' BILL OF
RIGHTS PROTECTS RANK AND FILE UNION MEMBERS ONLY-Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431 (1982).
In November 1977, fifteen members of Local 20 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, actively campaigned for
the re-election of incumbent union president, Omar Brown.
The fifteen members were also employed as business agents of
the union. They were appointed to these positions in 1975 by
Brown during his term as president. In December 1977, Harold Leu defeated Brown in his bid for the presidency of Local
20.1

Soon after taking office in January 1978, Leu discharged
all the business agents who had been appointed by Brown
during his previous term as Local 20 president.2 Leu's reason
for discharging the business agents was that the business
agents were loyal to Brown. Therefore, they would undermine
the new administration's policies and programs. 3
The discharged business agents filed suit in federal district court on January 6, 1978, challenging their dismissal
from union employment." The action was based on alleged violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 (the "Act").6 Specifically, the business agents relied upon the "Bill of Rights" provisions in the Act, which
guarantee equal voting rights and privileges to all union members, 6 as well as section 6091 of the Act which makes it unlaw0

1983 by Christopher Bruni
1. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 433 (1982).
2. The bylaws of Local 20 provide that the president shall have the power to
appoint and discharge the union's business agents. Termination of union employment
does not affect union membership. Id. at 434.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976) [hereinafter cited as "LMRDA"].
6. Labor Management and Disclosure Act of 1969, § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1976),
known as the "Bill of Rights" of the Act, states in pertinent part:
(1) EQUAL RIGHTS.-Every member of a labor organization
shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the delib-
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ful for the union or its representative, to "fine, suspend, expel
or otherwise descipline any of its members for exercising any
right to which he [sic] is entitled to under the provisions of
the Act. '"'
The district court granted summary judgment for the
union. The court stated that a union president had the right
to discharge union employees from their appointed positions
without violating the Act, so long as the employees' rights as
members of the union were not affected.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed without a published opinion.' 0 The United States Supreme Court affirmed, and held that the Act protects a union
member from discipline by the union only with respect to his
"rights or status as a member of the union," and not as an
employee of the union." In addition, the Court stated that the
"Bill of Rights" provisions of the Act do not prohibit the termination of appointed union employees, nor do they prevent
an elected union leader from selecting a staff which holds
views compatible with his own.'"
erations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to
reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and
bylaws.
(2) FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY.-Every member
of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble
freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or
opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views,
upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any
business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of the meetings: Provided, that nothing herein shall be construed to impair the
right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to
the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its
performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
7. Section 609 of the Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent,
shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its
members for exercising any right to which he [sic] is entitled under the
provisions of this Act. The provisions of section 102 shall be applicable
in the enforcement of this section.
29 U.S.C. § 529 (1976).
8. Id.
9. Navarro v. Leu, 469 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
10. Navarro v. Leu, 652 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1981).
11. 456 U.S. at 434.
12. Id. at 441.
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Petitioners first claimed that their voting and free speech
rights, as protected by the Act, were infringed upon by their
discharge from union employment.13 The Court addressed this
issue by looking at the legislative history of the Act and the
language of the relevant provisions. The Court noted that the
primary objective of the statute was to ensure that labor unions would be governed democratically, and that union members would be guaranteed freedom of expression without fear
of sanctions by union leaders. 4 The Court stated that the Act
only applied to "rank and file union members," and that Congress did not intend to grant job security to union employees
or officers when it enacted the statute."1
The petitioners argued further that their discharge from
union employment resulted from their participation in the
union campaign process. The petitioners alleged that this
amounted to "discipline" under section 609 of the Act, and
"that termination of union employment is therefore unlawful
when predicated upon an employee's exercise of rights guaranteed to members under the Act."'"
The Court also rejected this argument. The Court interpreted section 609 of the Act to mean that the term "discipline" applied only to actions which affect an individual's
"rights or status as a member of the union.'

7

The Court

stated that termination of union employment did not affect
such rights or status of union members, nor did it impinge
upon any facet of union membership."8 The Court observed
that section 609 prohibits certain disciplinary actions from being taken against union members, whereas a separate section
of the Act specifically deals with the disciplining of officers or
agents of the union.' 9 The Court noted that this was persuasive indication of Congress' intent to have section 609 refer
13. Petitioners relied specifically on sections 101(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) and (2). See supra note 6.

14. 456 U.S. at 435-36. The LMRDA was originally enacted to curb the abuses
of power by union leadership. The legislation concentrated on regulation of union
trusteeships and elections, but eventually other amendments were added which focused on increased protection of union members' basic rights. Id. at 435. See also 105
CONG. REC. 5806-07, 5811 (1959), II LEG. HisT. 1098-99.
15. 456 U.S. at 437.
16. Id. See supra note 7.
17. 456 U.S. at 437.
18. Id. at 438.
19. Id. See § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5).
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only to "punitive actions diminishing membership rights, and
not to termination of a member's status as an appointed
union employee."20
Finally, the Court discussed whether the petitioners could
plausibly maintain an independent action against the union
for preventing petitioners from exercising their rights of free
speech and assembly under section 102 of the Act."' The
Court stated that an action based on section 102 is independent of an action based on section 609, and could be used "to
I redress an 'infringement' of 'rights secured' under Title
' 22
609.
section
of
violation
a
stating
without necessarily
The Court noted that the petitioners clearly had the right
under section 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) to campaign and vote
for their candidate in the election. However, the Court found
that in this instance the petitioners had not been wholly prevented from exercising those rights.2 3 The petitioners themselves alleged only an "indirect interference

' 24

with their

membership rights, and this alone was not enough to convince
the Court that there had been a violation of section 102 of the
Act.
The Court concluded that it need not decide whether the
termination of a union member from a union office was a violation of section 102, since the right of a union leader to select
a staff with views compatible with his own overrode that section of the Act.
20. 456 U.S. at 438. See § 201(a)(5)(H) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 431(a)(5)(H). See
also H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1959) (conference Report on
LMRDA of 1959).
21. Section 102 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 states in part: "[Alny person whose
rights secured by provisions of this chapter [Title I of the Act dealing with the Bill of
Rights of the union members] have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter
may bring a civil action in district court of the United States for such relief as may be
appropriate."
Section 102 therefore seems duplicative of section 609 of the Act, but, as the
Court explained, the two sections were designed to address different areas of conflict.
Section 102 was introduced to enforce provisions of Title I by giving union members
an individual right of action. Section 609 was designed to provide criminal penalties
and focused primarily on election violations. 456 U.S. at 439-40 n.10.
22. 456 U.S. at 439. Section 609 applies to any disciplinary action taken in retaliation for a member exercising any right under the Act. See supra note 7. Section

102 only protects rights secured under Title I of the Act related to the Bill of Rights
of the members. See supra note 21.
23.

456 U.S. at 440.

24. Id.
25. Id. at 440-41. The Court based its reasoning on both the Congressional in-
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The basis of the Court decision was the legislative history
and statutory text of relevant provisions of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.26 The Act was

originally introduced into Congress as part of a plan to control
the abuse of power by union leadership, specifically in the
area of union elections. In addition to developing regulations
to govern union elections, Congress also enacted amendments
which guaranteed basic voting and free speech rights to union
members. 28 The Court noted that such safeguards were neces-

sary to ensure a union member's freedom of expression with29
out fear of reprisal by union leaders.
The Court granted certiorari in this case in order to resolve a string of conflicting circuit court decisions." Most notable were Grand Lodge of International Machinists of
America, AFL-CIO v. King,3 1 and Newman v. Local 1101,82
two conflicting opinions regarding the validity of discharge
from union employment under the Act.
In Grand Lodge, union members claimed that they were
discharged from union employment because they actively supported a particular candidate in a union election." Their campaign activity consisted of assembling with other members
and openly supporting that particular candidate.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that the right to engage in union politics was guaranteed to all members of the union by sections 101(a)(1) and
101(a)(2) of the Act. The court also stated that there was
tent of the Act, and the fact that the bylaws of the union gave the president plenary
powers to appoint and discharge the union's business agents at his discretion. The
Court found that the Act's overriding objective "was to ensure that unions be democratically governed and responsive to the will of the union membership as expressed
through open, periodic elections." Also, "the ability of an elected union president to
select his own administrators is an integral part of ensuring a union administration's
responsiveness to the mandate of the union election." Id. at 441.
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531.
27. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959) reprinted in 1959 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2424. See supra note 14.
28. See supra note 14.
29. 456 U.S. at 435-36.
30. Id. at 433. See, e.g., Lamb v. Miller, 660 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Maeira v.
Pagan, 649 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981); Newman v. Local 1101, Communications Workers
of Am., AFL-CIO, 570 F.2d 439 (2nd Cir. 1981); Grand Lodge of the Int'l Machinists
v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
31. 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
32. 570 F.2d 439 (2nd Cir. 1978).
33. 335 F.2d at 340.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

nothing in the statutory language, nor in the legislative history of the Act, which indicated that these guarantees of free
speech and voting rights were to be inapplicable to officermembers.3 4 Additionally, the court found that section 609 of
the Act did make it unlawful for a union to discharge union
employees for exercising any right protected under the Act.
The court also held that an action could be brought under
section 102 by the union members to enforce the specific provisions of section 609.35
In Newman, members of the local union brought suit
against the union, alleging a violation under the Act of their
free speech rights as union members.3 6 Appellee Newman had
been removed from his position as job steward by union officials after engaging in disruptive conduct and speaking out at
a union meeting. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that a union employee, because he is already a
union member, enjoys the rights of free speech and assembly
provided by the Act. Therefore, suspension or discharge predicated on the exercise of these rights would be a violation of
the Act. 88 However, the court stated that a union official has
"certain duties" towards the labor organization, and once he
accepts a union position and the obligation to carry out the
union's policies, he may not engage in conduct which would be
inconsistent with those duties.3 9 To do so would be to risk discharge from the union office, as such conduct prevents effective union representation.'0
The court in Newman held that the union could dis34. Id. at 343. The defendant in this case argued unsuccessfully that Congress
did intend for union officers to be excluded from the protective sections of Title I of

the Act. The defendant called attention to the fact that, as originally enacted, §
101(a)(4) was applicable to both union "members or officers," yet as the bill passed

through conference, the words "or officers" were deleted. Therefore, claimed the defendant, there was a Congressional intent to exclude union officers from the protection of Title I. The court rejected this argument, stating that Congress was merely
getting rid of surplussage, since union officers were already union members. Id. at
343-44 n.12.
35. Id. at 344.
36. 570 F.2d 439 (2nd Cir. 1978). Specifically, members relied on sections
101(a)(2) and 609 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), 529. See supra notes 6-7.
37. Plaintiff Newman contended that he was discharged for "his repeated expression of views in opposition to union leadership." 570 F.2d at 447.

38. Id. at 445.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
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charge the union employee from his position as job steward
for unacceptable conduct, sections of the Act notwithstanding.
The court noted that discharge under those circumstances
would not be a violation of sections 101 or 609 of the Act,
since Congress did not intend Title I of the Act to protect
union employees or officers from removal from office.4
In resolving the conflict between the two cases, the Finnegan Court stated that it was apparent from the language of
sections 101(a)(1),(2), and 609, and the legislative history of
Title I, that Congress was only seeking to protect union members under the Act.42 The Court maintained that Congress did
not intend section 609 to create a system of job security for
union employees. 43 The Court also stated that section 609 of
the Act applied only to members, and therefore action taken
against union employees or officers did not come within the
scope of section 609 unless it directly impinged upon a member's rights as a member.4 4
In deciding this case the Court did not devise any new
applications of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. Rather, the Court simply handed down a decision which was a cautious interpretation of both the language of the Act and its legislative history. Perhaps the Court
chose this approach because there were so many conflicting
circuit court decisions on this issue.
In deciding that the Act was meant to protect rank and
file union members only, and not union employees or officers,
the Court was selective as to those sections of the Act's legislative history it reviewed. Nonetheless, the Court was adamant that the Act's main objective was to ensure union democracy.4 5 However, the Court neatly passed over the issue of
whether or not a different decision would be reached if a sec41. Id. The court also stated: "We do not believe that Congress intended Title I
of the Act to insulate union officials, employees, or agents from removal, or to permit
a union representative who disagrees with its leadership to freeze himself in office on
First Amendment grounds." Id.
42. 456 U.S. at 436-37. The Court chose to read the legislative history of section
101(a)(4) differently than did the court in Grand Lodge. The Court deemed it an
important factor that Congress changed the original version of section 101(a)(4) of
the Act from "member or officer" to simply "member." Id. at 437 n.7. This change
was interpreted by the Court to evince Congressional intent that the Act apply only
to union members. Id. See supra note 34.
43. 456 U.S. at 438.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 440.
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tion 102 claim was presented by a non-policymaking employee. It would seem plausible that a nonconfidential member of the president's staff would be immune from discharge,
since that member would not interfere with efficient union administration. The Court stated that this issue was not decided
and would have to wait for another case."
The Court also neglected to rule on the rights of an
elected business agent, as opposed to one who is merely appointed to that office. If the business agent or similar officer is
elected to an office, it appears that the Court would immunize
him from discharge by the union president. Such a ruling
would seem a logical extension of the Court's emphasis on its
interpretation of the Act, that is, union democracy.47 The
Court's sole comment on this issue was that as long as the Act
promotes fair elections and protects rank and file union members from capricious acts 4by union leaders then the objective
of the Act has been met. "
Where does this leave the union member who does wish
to participate in union politics? The Court concluded that his
position is a precarious one, especially if the member is also a
union officer or employee." The union officer or employee
must enter the field of union politics at his own risk; the
Court gives no concrete rules as to what type of treatment
would be acceptable under the Act. It merely says that a
union president's prerogative to choose a compatible staff
more clearly manifests the objective of the Act, than does
safeguarding union employment.' 0
The Court held that the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act protects a union member from discipline
by the union only with respect to his rights as a member of
the union, and not as an employee or officer of the union."
The Court also stated that the "Bill of Rights" provisions in
the Act do not prohibit the termination of appointed union
employees, especially when they come into conflict with an
elected union leader's need to select his own staff." The Court
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

441 n.11.
441.
437.
442.

at 437-38.
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has issued a warning to union officers who wish to participate
in union politics: Enter at your own risk; only union "members" are protected under the "Bill of Rights" provisions of
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
ChristopherBruni

REAL PROPERTY-PROSPECTIVE TENANT DENIED
HOUSING BECAUSE OF ADULTS-ONLY POLICY HAS
CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND FAIR HOUSING ACT-Halet v. Wend Investment Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
Robert Halet was refused an apartment because of an
adults-only rental policy that excluded his son. He filed suit'
in federal court against the apartment owner, Wend Investment Co., and the County of Los Angeles asserting that the
rental policy was racially discriminatory and infringed upon
his fundamental right to live with his family. Halet charged
that the policy violated the fourteenth amendment,2 the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,3 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
(Fair Housing Act), 4 and 42 U.S.C. sections 1981-1983.5
0 1983 by Margaret G. Laliberte.
1. The suit was filed as a class action by Sander Michael Halet (the child), by
his father and guardian ad litem, Robert Halet, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, and by the Children Project of the Church of Life. Halet v. Wend
Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides, in pertinent part: "[No state shall]
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) provides: "No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976). The Fair Housing Act provides in pertinent
part:
[I]t shall be unlawful(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or
to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976).
(a) The rights granted by section ... 3604 . . . of this title may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate United States district courts without regard to the amount in controversy and in appropriate State or
local courts of general jurisdiction.
42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
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Halet's racial claim is novel because he is white; moreover, the
fair housing statute he invoked specifically protects against
discrimination only on the basis of race, religion, sex, and national origin.
The District Court for the Central District of California
dismissed the complaint against defendant Wend on two
grounds. The court found the case moot because Wend had7
dropped its policy against renting to families with children.
Further, the court held that Halet had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The district court also
dismissed the defendant County, without leave to amend,
finding that the discrimination was not invidious and the
state action was insufficient to support a claim based upon the
fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Finally,
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
43 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
6. Halet's claim of racial discrimination was based on the argument that discrimination against children has the effect of discriminating against blacks and Hispanics because statistically those groups have more children than do whites. Clearly
Halet could not argue that he, as a white, had been discriminated against on the basis
of his race. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1307 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982).
7. After Halet filed his claim, the City of Los Angeles passed an ordinance
prohibiting adults-only rental policies. Although the apartment unit in question was
not affected by that ordinance, since it lay outside the city limits, Wend voluntarily
dropped the exclusionary policy for all its units, stating that it wanted to maintain a
uniform policy. Id. at 1307.
8. Halet's initial complaint alleged merely that the County leased the land to
Wend. In his opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss (and in his appellate
brief), Halet alleged in addition that the County 1) owned the land leased to Wend
for the apartment complex, 2) used federal and state funds to acquire and prepare
the land as part of a large redevelopment project, 3) leased the land for the public
benefit in providing housing and included in the leased terms prohibition of racial
and religious discrimination, 4) had final approval of all building plans, and 5) con-
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the court noted that since children are not an insular minority, the rental policy was subject to only rational review. The
policy withstood this lesser degree of scrutiny.9
In a brief unanimous opinion,10 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding on
mootness and state action, thereby allowing Halet to proceed
with his constitutional challenge against both defendants. In
deciding the mootness issue, the circuit court followed wellestablished precedent "controlling voluntary abandonment of
a challenged activity."" When a defendant has voluntarily
ceased the activity, the tests are whether there is a reasonable
expectation that the alleged violation will recur and whether
interim relief or events have completely eradicated the effects
of the violation.12 The court of appeals found that Wend's
mere statement that it had dropped the challenged rental policy simply did not meet these tests. The district court had
thus erred in finding in that statement a sufficient demonstration of mootness.
Although the district court had not expressly addressed
the issue of standing, the court of appeals raised it on its own
initiative.'3 The court discussed the classic requirement of
standing: A party must be personally injured by the challenged activity and must assert its own interests rather than
those of a third party. 4 The court went on to state that these
trolled the use of the apartment and the amount of rents charged the tenants. Halet
further alleged that Wend must abide by the conditions of the lease and that it paid a
percentage of the rental receipts to the County. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d
1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court, however, refused to allow Halet to
amend his complaint to allege these additional facts.
9. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938),
where Justice Stone suggested, in an often quoted note, that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."
10. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
11 See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (challenged
practices of hiring firemen, voluntarily abandoned); United States v. W.T. Grant Co.,
345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (voluntary resignation from allegedly illegal interlocking corporate directorates). These cases also control when a promise to abandon has been
made.
12. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979).
13. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982). Even if the trial
court erred regarding jurisdiction, its decision will be affirmed if the complaint failed
to state a cause of action. See Shipley v. United States, 608 F.2d 770, 773-74 (9th Cir.
1979).
14. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co. 672 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982). The court noted
that Article III requires only the injury. But "prudential interests," the object of
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requirements may be waived in some discrimination cases. For
example, a white person may bring a racial discrimination
claim if that person is the most or only effective adversary. 5
However, since Halet was a less effective adversary than a
nonwhite parent with young children would have been, he had
no standing to assert racial discrimination claims under the
fourteenth amendment or under the Civil Rights Act, sections
1981, 1982, 1983, or 2000d."e
The court, however, had no difficulty granting Halet
standing to raise a racial discrimination claim under section
3604 of the Fair Housing Act. 17 In reaching its conclusion the
court relied upon Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood.' 8 In Gladstone, the plaintiffs were the village and six
individuals, four of whom were village residents (only two of
the individuals were black). The individual plaintiffs claimed
to have been injured as homeowners of Bellwood, where the
9
defendants allegedly had carried out racial steering practices
in violation of section 3604. The asserted injury lay in being
which is to limit access to the courts to those parties best suited to assert a claim,
have led the Supreme Court to add the further requirement that the party assert only
its own interests. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
15. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co. 672 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982). The court distinguished Halet from Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969) and Barrows v. Williams, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). The plaintiffs in Sullivan were a white homeowner and his tenant, a black. They challenged the cancellation of the homeowner's
recreational club membership because Sullivan had protested the club's refusal to
allow him to assign his membership to the tenant. The Court held that Sullivan, a
Causasian, should have been allowed to sue under section 1982, even though he had
not been discriminated against personally on a racial basis. In Barrows a white person
was sued for damages by his former neighbors when he sold his house to a black
person in violation of a restrictive covenant. The Court held that allowing Barrows to
be sued would amount to state action which would interfere with Barrows' right to
the equal protection of the laws against racial discrimination in housing. See also
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), where it was held that racially restrictive covenants could not be enforced against black purchasers because such enforcement
would be state action denying equal protection to blacks under the fourteenth
amendment. In Halet, however, the court asserted that other more appropriate plaintiffs could be found. 672 F.2d at 1308-09.
16. In Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976), the Fourth Circuit held that relief under section 1981
was limited to correcting racial discrimination. Similarly, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court noted that section 1982 dealt only with racial
discrimination. By its terms section 2000d is limited to protection from discrimination on the grounds of "race, color, or national origin." See supra note 3.
17. See supra note 4.
18. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
19. Racial steering entails "directing prospective home buyers interested in
equivalent properties to different areas according to their race." 441 U.S. at 94.
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denied the benefits of living in an integrated society. Plaintiffs
did not claim, in other words, that they had themselves been
subject to the realtors' practices.
The Gladstone Court evaluated the legislative history of
the Fair Housing Act, and held that Congress had intended
standing under the Act to be as broad as article III of the
Constitution allows, that is, not subject to any prudential requirement of asserting only one's own interests. 20 Hence the
plaintiffs had standing to assert the rights of others, i.e., those
actually subject to the steering activity, provided that the article III minimum requirements had been met.
The Halet court's opinion stated, without comment, that
Halet claimed that he was denied an apartment because of a
rental policy that allegedly infringed upon the rights of racial
minorities. The court declared that this was sufficient to support Halet's standing under the Act. 2 ' The court also held

without comment that Halet could challenge Wend's rental
policy under section 198322 and the fourteenth amendment
"on the grounds that it violate[d] Halet's right to raise a family and discriminate[d] against families with children. 2 32
The court next addressed whether the district court had
erroneously dismissed the County as a defendant. The court
began by noting that a plaintiff must be able to show state
action in order to state a claim under either the fourteenth
amendment or section 1983.24 The court noted the circum-

stances of state involvement that Halet had alleged in his opposition to the motion to dismiss and in his appellate brief25
The court found that in dismissing the County without leave
to amend, the district court had abused its discretion; a trier
of fact, applying established principles, 6 could have found
20. Id. at 109. The Court characterized the minimum requirements of article III
as follows: "[A) plaintiff must always have suffered a 'distinct and palpable injury to
himself,' that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is granted." Id. at 100
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 440, 501 (1975)).
21. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982).

22.
23.

See supra note 5.
Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982).

24. Id. The Court explained that the "under color of state law" requirement of
section 1983 was equivalent to the fourteenth amendment's state action requirement.

25. See supra note 8.
26. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the Supreme
Court established the principles controlling state action in cases of discrimination
that appear to be purely private, as in Halet. In Burton a private restaurant had
refused service to the black plaintiff. The court in that case found that the state was
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state action in Halet if the facts alleged by Halet were true.
The court proceeded to decide whether the alleged discrimination against children entitled Halet to state a claim
under the fourteenth amendment. The district court had dismissed that claim, finding that the adults-only policy withstood rational review. The court of appeals, however, held
that strict scrutiny of a classification (here, families with
young children) was required by equal protection and due
process when the classification impermissibly interfered with
the exercise of a "fundamental right." 8 Halet was attempting
to exercise the fundamental right of privacy.
In finding the right of privacy in the facts of Halet, the
court relied heavily upon Moore v. City of East Cleveland."
Moore held that the right of family members to live together
was part of the fundamental right of privacy.30 The Moore
Court held further that although the family is not beyond regulation, "when the government intrudes on choices concerning
family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully
the importance of the governmental interests advanced and
the extent to which they are served by the challenged
'
regulation. ""
The Halet court reasoned that if Moore held that the
right of extended family members to live together was fundamental, a fundamental right was even more clearly involved
when members of an immediate family desired to live together. The court buttressed its position by stating that there
actually a "joint participant" in the restaurant's enterprise. The public city garage in
which the restaurant leased space was dedicated to "public uses," and the costs of
land acquisition, construction, and maintenance were defrayed by rental income as
well as parking receipts, loans, and bonds. Justice Clark's majority opinion stressed
that the determination of sufficient state involvement must be made within the
framework of the particular circumstances of each case and that a precise formula is
an impossibility. But once a sufficient nexus is found between the state and the challenged activity, "the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment must be complied
with by the lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants written into the
agreement itself." Id. at 726.
27. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982).
28. See Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) cert. denied, 451 U.S. 940 (1981); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
17 (1973).
29. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).

30. Id. at 498-99. Moore involved a city zoning ordinance that had defined allowable "family" units to exclude the plaintiff, who lived with two grandchildren who
were cousins rather than brothers.
31. Id. at 499.
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exists a fundamental right to be free from government interference with decisions concerning family relationships.3 2 Its
statement parallels the Moore Court's declaration that numerous cases have consistently acknowledged a "private realm of
family life" which the state is forbidden to enter.3 3
The court noted, however, that even though it had found
state action that infringed upon a fundamental right, strict

scrutiny of the challenged activity would not be triggered un-

less a significant deprivation of the right had taken place. 4
The court held, therefore, that on remand the district court
was to consider if such a deprivation' occurred in Halet. If so,
the trial court was to then subject the adults-only policy to
strict scrutiny. 8
Finally, the circuit court found a cause of action for
Halet's racial discrimination claim under section 3604 of the
Fair Housing Act. 6 Halet argued that discrimination against
children was an aspect of racial discrimination and therefore
was proscribed by the Act. The court found support for this
argument in the willingness of both lower federal courts and
the Supreme Court to find forbidden discrimination in activities that have either a discriminatory intent or discriminatory
effect, when the challenge is based upon a civil rights statute. The Halet court held, without further comment, that
32. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982).
33. 431 U.S. at 499, (quoting Prince v. Massachusettes, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)).
34. The court cited two Ninth Circuit decisions that support this limitation
upon strict scrutiny: Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water Transp. Facilities Div., 651 F.2d
661, 665 (9th Cir. 1981) (deprivation must be significant penalty on the right) and
Socialist Workers Party v. March Fong Eu, 591 F.2d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 1978) (extent and nature of restriction's impact on the right must be examined). The court
expressly held that the standard in Hawaii Boating, a "genuinely significant deprivation," was controlling in Halet. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir.
1982).
35. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982).
36. See supra note 4.
37. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employment discrimination); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977) (housing
discrimination); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Co. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) (housing); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (housing). See also Hsia, The
Effects Test: New Directions, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 777 (1977); Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L.
REV. 129 (1976). Under the "effects theory," a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
by alleging that the challenged activity has a discriminatory effect. The burden then
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the effect is somehow justifiable. Note,
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since Halet's complaint included documents that "seem[ed] to
show some possibility of discriminatory effect," the allegations
were sufficient to state a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act." The court declined to decide, however, what standards it would apply to determine how important a discriminatory effect is in proving a violation of the Act. It noted that
this determination would take place if and when the case
came before the court again with a fully developed record.
The Ninth Circuit's approval of Halet's use of the fourteenth amendment and the Fair Housing Act to assert a claim
of discrimination against children is unique among the circuits. It represents a straightforward application of the principles that underlie those laws. The court's holding regarding
the "fundamental right to be free from state intrusion in decisions concerning family relationships"39 is a logical application
of Moore. The Moore Court had searched for basic reasons
why certain family rights had been afforded protection under
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. ° That
Court reasoned generally that such protection could not be
derived from precise terms of the Constitution. Rather, it explained that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family because the tradition of the family is deeply rooted in
United States history."' Moore went on to hold that that respect of family encompassed the extended as well as the nuclear family; the city of East Cleveland could not constitutionally "standardize" its citizens by forcing them all, through its
zoning ordinances, to "live in certain narrowly defined family
patterns."
Moore, then, stood for the principle that the state may
not establish zones in which families-nuclear or exhowever, that the effects theory is applicable only to a statutory challenge. When the
challenge has a constitutional,rather than statutory, basis, the Court has consistently
required proof of intent to discriminate. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
38. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982). Halet provided
a statistical table that indicated the percentages of households of blacks, Hispanics,
whites, and those headed by women that included children. Id. at n.6.
39. Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982).
40. 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977).
41. Id. 503-04. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family,
93 HARv. L. REV. 1156, 1177 (1980), notes that the Supreme Court's recent family law
cases have "turned to tradition as a source of previously unrecognized aspects of the
liberty protected by the due process clauses." In other words, in family cases the
validity of substantive due process has been reaffirmed.
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tended-may not live. Halet extended the Moore principle.
Under Halet the state may not accomplish the same exclusionary results indirectly by permitting and controlling terms
in an adults-only lease clause.42
The Halet decision marks the first time a circuit court
has allowed a Fair Housing Act cause of action for discrimination against children in housing. 3 The basis upon which the
court made its decision, however, is not new. Courts have applied the effects theory and have widely accepted the use of
statistics to show that minorities were disproportionately affected by a challenged action." Logically, if the discriminatory effect is "disproportionate enough, ' 45 any correlation between race and challenged activity may be valid. Two district
court cases illustrate this. The court in United States v. Henshaw Brothers, Inc.4 found that a landlord's refusal to rent
apartments to military personnel below the rank of major violated section 3604 because 99% of black military personnel
held below-major rank. 41 In United States v. Housing Authority of the City of Chickasaw,4 ' the challenged action was the
city's requirement that only citizens of the city were eligible
for housing in its housing authority units. Since the citizenry
was exclusively white, that policy was clearly discriminatory
49
in effect.
A plaintiff who has been granted a cause of action under
the effects theory, of course, merely is allowed to withstand an
adversary's initial motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action. No consistent circuit court guidelines exist for
determining at what point a sufficiently disproportionate effect has been shown to successfully prove a Fair Housing Act
violation. Three circuits have found that the Act was violated
when local governments had refused to zone for or construct
42. Halet alleged that the County's lease with Wend forbade Wend to discriminate on a racial or religious basis in its leases with tenants. See supra note 8. Hence
the County had already exercised its power to control Wend's rental policies.
43. Compare the cases cited supra note 34 and infra notes 44-47.
44. For example, the court in Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d
Cir. 1977), found a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act because 95% of the
individuals eligible for a delayed housing project were non-white (85% of the eligible
individuals were black).
45. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
46. 401 F. Supp. 399 (D.C. Va. 1974).
47. Id. at 401-02.
48. 504 F. Supp. 716 (D.C. Ala. 1980).
49. Id. at 731-32.
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low-income housing.50 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
on the other hand, has held 5 that refusal to rent to welfare
recipients because they could not meet a particular rent-toincome ratio was not refusal on a racial basis. The court so
held even though expert testimony indicated that eligibility of
white households was four times as great as that of black
households and ten times as great as that of Puerto Rican
households.5 2 The Halet court, however, declined at this juncture to indicate what guidelines it would adopt for the Ninth
Circuit when presented with the question.
Only a handful of states have enacted legislation prohibiting housing discrimination against families with children.5 3 In
California all attempts to pass such legislation have so far
been defeated. 4 The California practitioner should be aware,
however, that the California Supreme Court held in Marina
Point v. Wolfson, 5 that the Unruh Act 56 shields children or
families with children from discrimination in rental housing.
A few California county and municipal ordinances also prohibit discrimination on that basis.5 7 In California, then, a victim of such discrimination may be more likely to receive relief
by bringing an action in state court under Marina Point.
Most challenges to housing discrimination involve conduct of purely private landlords; the state action required to
bring a constitutional challenge in federal court is usually
lacking. The constitutional aspect of the Halet decision is
therefore of limited use to most prospective plaintiffs. In find50. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977); Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Co. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977); United
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1042 (1975).
51. Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896
(1975).
52. Id. at 1117 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Boyd was severely criticized, however,
in the dissenting opinion and elsewhere, because the cases cited in the court's analysis
were decisions based on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. See 509 F.2d at
1116 (Mansfield, J., dissenting); Hsia, supra note 37, at 799-800.
53. Arizona, ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317 (West Supp. 1982); Delaware, DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (1975); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, §
4.11 (West Supp. 1982); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-101 (West Supp. 1982);
New York, N.Y. REAL PROP. §§ 236-237 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
54. Dunaway & Blied, DiscriminationAgainst Children in Rental Housing: A
California Perspective, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 21, 24 n.12 (1979).
55. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
56. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1982).
57. See Dunaway & Blied, supra note 54, at 51 n.146.
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ing that racial discrimination may be an effect of discrimination against children, the Ninth Circuit made the Fair Housing Act available to all renters with children who have been
denied rental housing because of their children. In so doing
the court lent critical support to the fight for adequate
housing.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Halet held that
discrimination against children in rental housing may infringe
upon the constitutional right to privacy. Furthermore, a plaintiff who claims that such discrimination has a disproportionate impact upon minority groups has a cause of action under
the federal Fair Housing Act. Halet, however, represents only
the opening of the courtroom door. The court declined to establish the standards it will use to determine if a particular
effect actually violates the Act. Without these standards the
usefulness of the effects theory in litigation of certain racial
discrimination cases remains problematic.
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